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Abstract 
 
Drawing on recent liberal peace and Asian security research, this article assesses the relevance of 
prominent “Kantian” hypotheses for understanding the international politics of Asia. While many 
regional analysts’ expectations about the general efficacy of international organizations for 
reducing conflict in Asia are confirmed, specific assertions about ASEAN and other well-known 
organizations do not find strong support. Although the role of regime type is often ignored in 
discussions of international security in Asia, there is qualified evidence for a democratic peace 
effect in Asia. The third leg of the Kantian triangle, international economic interdependence, does 
not seem consistently important for reducing conflict in Asia, even though there is a high level of 
trade interdependence among Asian states. In fact, higher levels of trade with China tend to 
increase conflict among Asian dyads including China. Asian states’ relations with states outside 
the region conform well to liberal expectations. While the findings support the idea that Asia is to 
some extent “different,” they also show that general Kantian and realist theories are relevant, and 
that common assumptions of specialists on the region are not always in accord with the 
regularities of conflict and peace in Asia. 
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Do the Liberal Peace propositions apply to Asia? A large number of quantitative 
studies show that three “Kantian” variables are strongly and causally associated with 
peaceful interstate relations: democracy, international organizations and law, and 
international economic interdependence. The effects of these variables, with roots in 
the liberal philosophy of thinkers like Immanuel Kant (1999 [1795]), are assumed to 
be universal, and studies typically include pooled data for all states in the international 
system (e.g., Oneal, Oneal, Maoz, and Russett 1996; Oneal and Russett 1997; Russett, 
Oneal, and Davis 1998; Oneal and Russett 1999; Cederman and Rao 2001; Russett 
and Oneal 2001; Cornwell and Colaresi 2002; Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001; 
Jungblut and Stoll 2002; Kinsella and Russett 2002; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 
2003). But other recent quantitative research on the sources of international conflict 
and war clearly shows regional differences in both the level of militarized conflict and 
its roots (Lemke 2002; Gleditsch 2002a). Some authors have also applied these 
findings to examine regional variations in variables relevant to the liberal peace 
propositions, and found important regional differences (Goldsmith 2004; Henderson 
2004). Such research builds on a number of other works exploring the possibility of 
significant regional variations in the causes and patterns of conflict and other aspects 
of international relations (e.g., Ayoob 1995; Buzan 1991; Holsti 1996; Kacowicz 
1998; Solingen 1998).  
 Concurrently, but largely in isolation from these areas of broad theory and 
quantitative research, among specialists in the international relations of Asia and the 
Asia-Pacific area there has been debate about whether Asian international relations 
are qualitatively different from those in other parts of the world, and thus 
inappropriate for study in the framework of general theories (e.g., Acharya 2003; 
Kang 2003). Regional specialists have also argued about which factors are more or 
less conducive to peace or conflict in the region, both during and after the Cold War. 
These studies have mainly used small samples of case-study evidence or logical 
arguments backed up by supporting anecdotes. Recently this debate has turned to a 
discussion of the relative weight of international institutions and international trade, 
on the one hand, and power balances and major power proclivities on the other (e.g., 
Berger 2000; Friedberg 1993/94). These factors have clear theoretical links to the 
liberal and realist schools of international relations, as many Asia-focused analysts 
recognize.  
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 This article rests at the intersection of these two avenues of research. By using 
large-sample quantitative evidence I attempt to introduce a degree of theoretically-
based control of confounding factors not common in studies drawing on small 
samples or detailed accounts of a few events. By focusing on one region of the world, 
I attempt to draw on the arguments and evidence presented by specialists in the 
international politics of that region to produce a more contextually informed study. 
This approach allows me to begin to test competing hypotheses as they relate to Asian 
states broadly defined, and also to examine specific Asian international governmental 
organizations (IGOs) and the international relations of China. The results have 
implications for general understandings of international conflict as well. 
 
Debates on Asian Security 
Even the definition or boundaries of “Asia” is a topic of debate among regional 
specialists. Defining “Asia” is of course not a simple task, and no definition has 
achieved a consensus (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002, 601-602). In this study I use a 
broad definition, both for practical and conceptual reasons. Practically, the more states 
included in my sample, the more reliable my statistical results are likely to be. Using a 
broad definition can also be seen as a conservative strategy if the universality or 
generality of some hypotheses is to be challenged. A narrow sample might include 
specific, but unmeasured, factors that affect a relatively small number of states, but 
nevertheless have a significant impact in a small, geographically limited sample. In 
such a sample, generally valid effects might be overshadowed by anomalous 
influences or omitted variable bias. If supposedly universal theories show no 
significant effects in a broader category of states, however, such claims of universality 
should be seriously questioned. 
 The more conceptual reason for including a broad area under the heading of 
“Asia” is that security issues across the wide geographical space stretching 
approximately from India to Japan, and North Korea to New Zealand, do seem to be 
linked. I follow the logic of a number of regional specialists on this count. Acharya 
(2003, 150-151), for example, argues that there is a “nexus” of security relations 
involving South Asia, Southeast Asia, and China. He focuses on the balancing 
dynamics between China and India, which necessarily entangle Southeast Asian states. 
Given Australia’s important role in Southeast Asian security issues, Oceania also 
logically falls within a broad definition of Asia. Since the fall of the USSR, the states 
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of Central Asia have increased their contacts with neighboring Asian states such as 
China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Therefore I include these states in the study as well 
after they achieve independence from the Soviet Union. Accordingly, in this paper I 
have defined “Asia” as including all states of South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast 
Asia, Oceania, and Central Asia (from 1991).1  
 Moving beyond the question of defining Asia, debates over Asian security 
issues can be roughly categorized as focusing on whether power dynamics prevail, 
meaning that conflict can be avoided mainly through deterrence and alliances, or 
whether economic interdependence and international institutions substantially 
mitigate conflict among Asian states. The first of these schools of thought clearly is 
connected to realist theories of international relations, while the latter has obvious 
liberal (and sometimes “constructivist”) roots. Few analysts focus on the role of 
democracy in the region, although this is another key liberal factor integral to recent 
research on the “democratic peace” and “liberal peace”. 
 In general, the essential element of a liberal argument for Asia is that one or 
more of these factors - institutions, interdependence, democracy -  can meaningfully 
and regularly help lead to a stable security order less threatened by shifting power 
relations, such as the rise of China. The essential element of a realist view is that even 
if such effects are apparent, they are in fact epiphenomenal to the power dynamics 
which really determine conflict or peace. Although rarely employed by regional 
specialists, multivariate statistical analysis is an appropriate tool for evaluating such 
competing claims because of the element of control it introduces. And a large-sample 
data set is also appropriate, although rarely used, because the arguments are expressed 
in general terms, but may be based on observation of only a few events. 
 
Competing expectations 
A review of Asian security debates clearly points to a number of specific expectations, 
sometimes contradictory, among analysts of the region about the roots of peace and 
conflict. 
 One fundamental expectation of some specialists (e.g., Kang 2003; 
Katzenstein 2000) is that the international politics of Asia are “different” from those 
in other parts of the world, especially “the West.” Culture and history combine in a 
                                                 
1 All sovereign states as categorized by the COW project in these geographic areas are included. These 
are all states with country codes from 700 to 990, or all states for which region = 4.  
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path-dependent process of interaction among states in a given region to create 
distinctive and empirically meaningful patterns of behavior and conflict. This 
contradicts the assumption of international relations generalists who commonly use 
pooled data for all states to test general hypotheses. If the effects of important 
influences on peace and conflict can be shown to differ significantly in Asia, this will 
support the area specialists’ arguments of an Asian difference. 
 A related but more nuanced expectation based on “constructivist” or 
culturally-based normative arguments is that Asian states’ relations with other Asian 
states will somehow qualitatively differ from relations between Asian and non-Asian 
states. Such expectations follow from arguments based on shared “Asian values” 
which inform foreign policy and create expectations about the proper norms of 
behavior within Asian dyads. The “ASEAN way” involving informal but substantive 
consultations among leaders, and placing a high value on both peaceful conflict 
resolution and strict respect for non-interference in internal affairs, is an example of 
such a set of norms applicable to a limited set of Asian states (e.g., Acharya 1991; 
Kivimaki 2001). Patterns of interaction for all Asian dyads and for some sub-regional 
groupings including ASEAN will be examined. 
 Among those Asia specialists taking a realist perspective, Friedberg (1993/94) 
argues that territorial disputes and security dilemmas among contiguous states and 
interested great powers are the greatest threats to Asian security, while power 
balancing and alliances are the keys to stability. Huxley (1998, 90) similarly dismisses 
the importance of “regional institutions and economic interdependence” and argues 
that “relative military power” is much more important to Asian security.  Tow and 
Gray (1995) argue that power balancing in Asia is they key to stability, with regional 
security regimes not yet likely to be effective. Kang (2003) argues that power 
hierarchy induces bandwagoning behavior, and thus stability, rather than balancing 
due to Asian cultural and historical characteristics. Although they may differ on 
specific issues or the relative importance of one relationship or another, authors in this 
school share agreement on the importance of factors of military power, and the 
relative unimportance of institutions, economic links, or regime type (see also Brecher 
1963; Shirk 1997). 
 On the other side of the debate, liberal (and constructivist) authors mainly 
focus on multilateral institutions (Acharya 1991; Aggarwal 1993; Chiang 2000; 
Kivimaki 2001; Scalapino 2001). The common strand to these studies is the idea that 
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international organizations in Asia are indeed effective constraints on conflict, even 
though they often lack the strong institutionalization of Western-style organizations 
such as the European Union or NATO. Thus Kivimaki (2001) locates the cause of a 
“long peace” in Southeast Asia in the norms and “intersubjective consensus” forged 
by the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN). Acharya (1991, 176) sees 
“tentative success” for ASEAN as a security community, in spite of the organization’s 
reliance on consensual and informal decision making. According to Chiang (2000, 
177), the “APEC way” owes its effectiveness to the “non-institutionalized cooperation 
regime” embodied in the organization. Aggarwal (1993, 1042), although recognizing 
their potential importance, sees the weakly institutionalized nature of Asian 
international organizations as more problematic for effective cooperation than others 
seem to. 
 And a relatively few authors consider in detail a broader range of liberal or 
constructivist factors including economic interdependence (Acharya 2003; Berger 
2000; Katzenstein 2000) and democratic governance (Berger 2000; Chan 1995). For 
example, Berger (2000, 417) argues that Asian states’ “intra-regional 
interdependence… has pushed up considerably the costs of military conflict,” making 
such conflict less likely. Chan (1995, 64) argues for a “pacifying effect” of greater 
levels of democracy in Asia, along the lines of the general democratic peace literature, 
even if democratization may cause some political instability. 
 All analysts seem to agree that some power-related “realist” factors will have 
continuing relevance in Asia. Liberal peace theorists also expect that power-related 
factors will retain importance for conflict (e.g., Russett and Oneal 2004). Acharya 
(1991) comes closest to questioning this assumption by asserting that relations 
between ASEAN states increasingly resemble those of a security community.  
  While both liberals and realists recognize the relevance of power in Asia, only 
liberals hold the expectation that international organizations and economic 
interdependence have much significance. And even among liberal and constructivist 
Asia specialists, few expect that regime type (e.g., democracy) will have much of an 
effect on international relations in Asia. But proponents of the liberal peace 
propositions as general effects in international relations have allowed for no such 
regional exceptions. 
 The remainder of this article is devoted to testing these various expectations 
and drawing conclusions about the causes of conflict and peace in Asia, and the 
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relevance of liberal theory to the region. In addition to the statistical analysis, the 
dynamics of one bilateral relationship, the Malaysia-Philippines dyad, are examined 
in some detail to illustrate and elaborate some of the conclusions. I also ask what 
these regional results tell us about general theories of international relations and their 
empirical evaluation.  
 While I find that the liberal peace is relevant to Asian international relations, I 
also find important differences between Asia and the rest of the world. These 
differences are not necessarily those commonly assumed by area specialists, however.  
 
Data and Methods 
The unit of analysis for this study is the dyad-year, the most common unit employed 
for study of the liberal peace propositions and other aspects of international conflict.  
The time frame is 1950-2000, a period which commences after the revolution in 
China (1949) and the independence of India (1947) and Indonesia (1949). This seems 
to be the earliest date from which the Asian regional subsystem can be considered 
stable in terms of major members, although some important states such as Malaysia 
gained independence later, and Japan regained full sovereignty only in 1952. The time 
period covers both the cold war and post-cold war eras, but available data for several 
indicators end in 2000. 
 The data are assembled from several sources. The choice of independent and 
dependent variables is guided mainly by the models commonly used in liberal peace 
research, which include a number of “liberal” and “realist” factors (e.g., Russett and 
Oneal 2001). Several variables and sub-sets of the data are also chosen based on the 
Asian context of the study. 
 The dependent variable is measured by data on militarized interstate disputes 
(MIDs) from the correlates of war (COW) project (Singer and Small 1972 [updated]). 
Data on all disputes, fatal disputes involving at least one death, and interstate war 
involving at least 1,000 battle deaths are used. A dummy variable for each is created. 
Only “politically relevant” dyads are used, here defined as all dyads contiguous on 
land or within 400 miles of water, and all dyads containing at least one major power. 
Politically relevant dyads (e.g., Cambodia and Vietnam, United States and Vietnam) 
are considered to have a much higher likelihood of conflict than other dyads in the 
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system (e.g., South Korea and Vietnam), which have lower levels of interaction and 
may simply not be capable of fighting each other even if they wanted to.2 
 Newly available updated data were used for each of the three “Kantian” 
independent variables. Substantially updated and corrected data from the Polity 
project, version IV, provide the indicator for regime type (Marshall and Gurr 2001). I 
use the standard index which combines autocracy and democracy scores to create a 
scale ranging from -10 (fully autocratic) to +10 (fully democratic). The lower Polity 
score of the two dyad members is used to measure the degree of democracy for the 
dyad, following the “weak link” approach (Russett and Oneal 2001, 99). A score of 
+7 or higher is used to gauge “democracy” as a category for the “Monadic 
democracy” indicator (Table 5). All independent variables (except those for distance 
and contiguity) are lagged by one year because causation, rather than simple 
correlation, is assumed and causal processes are not expected to be immediate. 
 Trade interdependence is measured using Gleditsch’s (2002b) updated dataset, 
version 4.0. These data correct for missing data and other problems with trade and 
GDP measures, and are updated to cover the period 1948-2000. Trade 
interdependence is measured using the lower score, within each dyad, of total dyadic 
trade over each state’s GDP. This provides an indicator of the degree of dependence 
on the trading relationship for the least dependent member of the dyad (and therefore 
also relies on the “weak link” logic).   
 Membership in international organizations is based on data from the COW2 
project collected by Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke (2003). These include 
memberships in all international organizations for the period 1815-2000. Total shared 
memberships were summed for each dyad. Since the data provided only contain 
observations at five-year intervals for the period to 1965, values are filled in until 
1965 by projecting summed memberships forward for 4 years. I also use dummy-
variable indicators of shared membership in specific organizations in some analyses, 
and these are measure using a dummy variables coded “1” if both states in a dyad are 
members, “0” otherwise (Table 4). The natural log transformation is used for both the 
lower interdependence score and the sum of international organization memberships.3  
                                                 
2 Lemke and Reed (2001) provide a critical evaluation of the potential pitfalls of using politically 
relevant dyads, but do not find serious instances of measurement error or selection bias. 
3 Natural logs are calculated after first adding “1” to each observation because zero values occur. An 
error in the coding of ASEAN memberships in the IGO data was corrected – dyads including Singapore 
and other members were added. 
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 The COW data were also used to measure several independent variables. A 
dummy variable for alliances was created based on joint membership in “mutual 
defense pact” alliances – the strongest form of alliance commitment in the COW data, 
involving a declared intention of either state to defend the other in case of attack. 
Ententes and neutrality pacts are not considered alliances in this analysis, because of 
the lower level of commitment they entail. However, results change little if they are 
included. The COW indicator for major power status, based mainly on historians’ 
evaluations, was used to determine whether a dyad contains only minor powers. A 
measure of contiguity is included with a higher threshold than that used for 
categorization of a dyad as “politically relevant.” The contiguity indicator is a dummy 
variable coded “1” if states share a land border or are separated by up to 24 miles of 
water, “0” otherwise. A similar dummy variable is created for colonial contiguity, if 
the colonial territory of one or both states meets these criteria. The composite index of 
national capabilities (CINC) was used to gauge power parity, taking the quotient of 
the smaller value over the larger, so that a dyad with perfect parity would score “1”, 
while complete asymmetry would score “0”. The indicator was transformed using the 
square root to better approximate a normal distribution. The distance indicator 
measures the distance between the capital cities of the states in the dyad, transformed 
with the natural log.4 
 The statistical method employed is logit analysis, appropriate for the 
dichotomous dependent variable, using the generalized estimating equation (GEE). 
This method is widely employed in quantitative studies of the liberal peace (e.g., 
Russett and Oneal 2001), and allows for logit analysis in time-series cross-sectional 
data, correcting for first-order autocorrelation (Zorn 2001). Interaction variables to 
judge the difference effects of the variables for Asian dyads are used where possible, 
but some equations fail using these interaction terms fail. The alternative approach of 
running the analysis including all Asian dyads, or all dyads of other groups of states 
(e.g., ASEAN, mixed Asian and non-Asian dyads) is also used.  
 
Summary statistics 
To begin, I present summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables, 
before transformation and lags (Table 1). These show some suggestive patterns that 
                                                 
4 All COW data are obtained from the data files included with EUGene software version 3.04 (Bennett 
and Stam 2000 [updated]).  
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indicate possible differences in conflict dynamics between Asia and other parts of the 
world. Asia has 3.45 times more conflict-years at all MID levels, 4.54 times more 
fatal dispute-years, and 6 times more war-years than the global average. These are 
substantial differences in conflict levels, but it should be noted that other research has 
pointed out wide variation in conflict levels across many regions of the world (e.,g., 
Lemke 2002), with the Middle East experiencing the highest levels and the West the 
lowest. Asia is only somewhat less conflictual than the Middle East (Goldsmith 2004). 
 Regarding the liberal Kantian variables, Asia is less democratic than the global 
average, scoring 2.43 points lower on the 21-point polity scale. The level of trade 
interdependence in Asia is nearly double the global average. And the level of joint 
dyadic membership in international organizations is somewhat (about 19 percent) 
below average. 
 Power-oriented variables also contain notable differences between Asian 
dyads and the overall average. Mutual defense pact alliances are much less common 
in Asia. The proportion of dyads including a major power is much lower. Instances of 
colonial contiguity among Asian states are lower, but the contiguity among sovereign 
states is higher (states have more neighbors at a closer distance). The average distance 
between Asian capitals is just over half the average for all dyads (note that this and 
the contiguity score include regional and global major-power dyads which can be 
great distances from each other). And Asian dyads are somewhat closer to power 
parity.  
 The summary statistics give some indication that Asia is an especially 
conflictual region, and that logical places to look for sources of conflict include a 
dearth of mutual defense pact alliances, the close proximity and multiple borders 
shared by Asian states, and the relatively even distribution of power resources. As far 
as the conflict-dampening Kantian factors, perhaps most surprising is the high level of 
economic interdependence – this would be expected to cause a reduction in conflict, 
while lower levels of democracy and international organization membership are 
consistent with greater conflict.  
 
Multivariate Analysis 
I now turn to multivariate analysis to assess the role of each of these factors while 
controlling for the others, and to evaluate the several expectations outlined above. The 
analysis first examines each of the “Kantian” variables in detail, then turns to power-
 11
related factors, and finally assesses factors affecting the conflict behavior of China in 
particular. 
 Accordingly, the data are subdivided in a number of ways. One sub-group 
already discussed is all Asian dyads. For these data, only politically relevant dyads for 
which both states are found in Asia, as defined above, are used. A dummy variable 
coded “1” for all Asian dyads is also created for use in interaction variables (Table 2). 
Another sub-set of the data is dyads for which only one member is in Asia. This group 
of “mixed” dyads is used to analyze Asian states’ interactions with politically relevant 
states outside the region (either states on the border (e.g., Iran), outside major powers 
(e.g., United States), or Asian major powers’ (China and Japan) interactions with 
outside states.  
 I have also divided the data into smaller subsets of Asian dyads based on three 
regional organizations: ASEAN, the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. 
For each of these, dyads of all states which are at any time members of the 
organization are included in the sub-group for all years, 1950-2000. Then a dummy 
variable for joint membership of both dyad members in the organization is included. 
In this way, an appropriate sample is created to gauge the effect of joint membership 
on conflict- containing only those states which at some point do join the organization. 
These subgroups correspond well to conventional sub-regions of Asia, as well. 
ASEAN was founded in 1967 and encompasses Southeast Asia, SAARC, founded in 
1985, South Asia, and APEC, founded in 1989, includes East Asia (north and south) 
and Oceania (non-Asian APEC members are excluded).5 Regional analysts usually 
consider ASEAN an archetypical example of the distinctive nature and potential 
effectiveness of Asian international institutions. APEC is also seen as moderately 
effective, if weakly institutionalized. SAARC does not have a reputation as very 
effective in reducing conflict (e.g., Jetly 2003). However, Bearce (2003) has shown 
that even apparently ineffective and economically-focused regional organizations can 
have a significant impact on conflict. 
 
                                                 
5  ASEAN includes politically relevant dyads for Brunei, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand. SAARC includes politically relevant dyads for 
India, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. APEC includes only the Asian 
members of this organization, or all politically relevant dyads for Australia, Brunei, China, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. 
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Trade Interdependence 
As suggested by the summary statistics, there is scant evidence that the pacific effects 
of economic interdependence are present in Asia as a whole. There is a significant 
difference between the effect of economic interdependence in Asia and the effect of 
this variable among all dyads. The coefficients are positive, but not quite large enough 
to reverse the sign of the overall effect.6 This is true for the pacific effect on all 
militarized interstate disputes and fatal disputes. For wars with at least 1000 battle 
deaths (Table 2, Models 1-3), there is no significant difference, and here the sign of 
the coefficient is negative, providing some support to liberal expectations. 
 Among all Asian dyads, economic interdependence does have a negative 
coefficient, but the effect does not reach statistical significance (Table 3, Models 4-6). 
Even with Asian dyads’ high levels of trade interdependence, this factor does not have 
a statistically significant effect on conflict. The direction of the effect is also negative 
for mixed Asian/non-Asian dyads, and in the case of fatal disputes (model 8), the 
effect is significant. 
 When important sub-groups of Asian states are examined, the influence of 
trade on conflict is also equivocal. There is a significant negative impact on conflict in 
Southeast Asia, as liberals would expect, and a negative but insignificant effect 
among Asian APEC states. But in South Asia the coefficient is positive, and 
approaches significance (Table 4, Models 10-12).  
 It is clear that trade interdependence does not consistently dampen conflict in 
Asia overall.7 It is perhaps easy to see why some regional analysts would point to 
interdependence as an important check on conflict in Asia – the level of 
interdependence is relatively high (Table 1). But even summary statistics indicate that 
this does not correspond with low levels of conflict. Multivariate analysis confirms 
the insignificance of trade in Asian security overall, and the significant difference this 
comprises from the overall global pattern. Asia is different in terms of the effect of 
trade on conflict. Although globally this effect has been questioned and shown to be 
dependent on other factors (e.g., Barbieri 1996; Hegre 2000; Mansfield and Pollins 
2001), in Asia overall the liberal expectation of pacific “trading states” finds almost 
no support, in spite of the region’s high levels of trade and reputation for a focus on 
                                                 
6 I.e., adding the coefficient for the overall Trade interdependence variables and the coefficient for the 
interaction terms still produces a negative number. 
7 This directly contradicts the results of a similar analysis by Goldsmith (2004), but that study used 
different and less complete trade data from Russett and Oneal (2001). 
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economic welfare as a source of regime legitimacy. There is somewhat stronger 
evidence that Asian states’ trade levels with states outside the region does reduce 
conflict, but this is not as robust a result as Kantian liberals might predict. And the 
substantive impact is not very large either among Asian or mixed dyads (Table 5).   
 
International Organizations 
Like international interdependence, international organizations are a liberal factor 
which clearly seems to have a different effect in Asia than in other parts of the world. 
The significant positive coefficients for the Asia/International Organization 
interaction terms   in Models 1-3 indicate this. However, unlike interdependence, joint 
membership in international organizations retains a clear significant negative effect on 
disputes and fatal disputes among Asian dyads (Table 3, Models 4-5), and approaches 
significance for wars as well. This is generally consistent with the emphasis placed on 
the role of such organizations by regional specialists. It is also very clear that Asian 
states which share larger numbers of joint memberships in international organizations 
with non-Asian states tend to experience less conflict at all levels with these states 
(Models 7-9). Perhaps most interestingly, it appears that the weakly institutionalized 
nature of international organizations in Asia contributes to a significant reduction in 
their impact, but there nevertheless is a conflict-reducing effect. The greater statistical 
significance and much greater substantive impact of IGOs on conflict among mixed 
dyads support this interpretation (Tables 3 and 5). 
 Indeed, when we move beyond generalization to examine some specific 
organizations in Asia, some of the assertions of regional specialists appear to be off 
the mark. Neither the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), nor the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum can be shown to have a significant effect on 
conflict (Table 4). The results show that once a dyad has joint membership in such an 
organization, there is no significant change in the level of conflict for that dyad, 
controlling for other factors (although the effect for ASEAN membership does 
approach significance). And only among APEC states (a broad group) is there a 
significant effect for international organizations in general. Within the context of 
Southeast Asia and South Asia, neither the web of shared organizational memberships 
nor the specific regional institutions often cited by analysts, seems relevant to conflict 
behavior. 
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 One realist author has termed Asian international institutions a “thin gruel” 
with little effect on conflict (Friedberg 1993/94, 22), while others have disputed this 
characterization, arguing that Asian institutions are different, but moderately effective 
(Acharya 1991 & 2003, Chiang 2000). The results here may help to clarify this debate. 
While it does not seem that the institutional “gruel” is much thinner in Asia (Table 1), 
it does appear that joint IGO membership among Asian states is comprised of a 
“mixed bag” of institutions, some apparently effective in their impact on conflict, at 
least in the aggregate, but others apparently ineffective or superfluous, as realists 
would expect. It appears that the effective institutions are likely to be universal or 
trans-regional in nature, while specifically Asian IGOs have little or no effect on 
conflict. Aggarwal (1993) therefore seems correct in his suspicion that Asian IGOs 
are weaker in their pacific effects.  
 Focusing on ASEAN, it appears, ironically, that where “Asian values” rhetoric 
has been highest, the norms of ASEAN do not have the alleged effect, while more 
trade-dependent dyads are more peaceful. There is little evidence here that the “long 
peace” of ASEAN (Kivimaki 2001) has much to do with ASEAN. Perhaps not too 
surprisingly, there does seem to be a democratic peace effect in South Asia, where 
fully democratic India interacts with other relatively or inconsistently democratic 
states, as well as with more authoritarian ones. The role of regime type is the subject 
of the next section. 
 
Democracy 
There are eighteen Asian states in the data set that are full-fledged democracies 
(polity score of 7 or higher) for at least one year during the period 1950-2000. These 
include countries with relatively brief periods as “democracies” such as Bangladesh 
(1972-1973) and Indonesia (1999-2000), as well as those that are consistently 
democratic for most or all or the period such as Japan, India, and South Korea. And 
these combine into twenty six fully democratic dyads in the data as well (a smaller 
democracy score of at least +7). Those with more than ten dyad-years each of joint 
democracy are Japan-Philippines, India-Pakistan, India-Myanmar (Burma)8, India-Sri 
Lanka, India-Malaysia, and Australia-Papua New Guinea. There are a total of 224 
                                                 
8 Burma achieves a score of “+8” in the Polity IV scale for the period 1947-1961. This corresponds to 
the period from independence until Ne Win’s military coup in 1962. 
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fully democratic dyad-years in the data for the Asia region, over 90 percent of which 
involve dyads with at least 8 years of joint democracy. 
So, while joint democracy is less common and regime type scores are lower 
than the global average, this does not mean that “democratic peace” hypotheses are 
simply irrelevant to Asia. Rather, all other things being equal (or controlled), 
democratic dyads should still be significantly associated with reduced conflict (and 
their absence should correspond to greater conflict). There is some evidence that this 
is so.  
 Given the rarity of regional analysis that points to the effects of democracy on 
conflict in Asia, it is noteworthy that this is the only Kantian variable which does not 
exhibit a significant difference in its effect in Asia, relative to other regions (Table 1, 
Models 1-3). While there is no significant effect of a “democratic peace” among 
Asian dyads overall, the effect of regime type is consistently negative. And there is 
certainly evidence of a democratic peace for interactions between Asian states and 
those outside the region, even controlling for alliance ties such as those between the 
U.S. and Japan or South Korea (Table 3). The substantive effect of joint democracy 
on mixed dyads is quite high, as well (Table 5). 
 Perhaps most interesting is the significant effect of higher levels of joint 
democracy in South Asia. In a region known for high levels of conflict, the only 
variable in this model to compete with the conflict-causing effect of power parity is 
the conflict-inhibiting effect of rising levels of joint democracy (Table 4, Model 11). 
As mentioned above, South Asia includes one consistently democratic state (India) 
and neighbors of various and varying regime types. For example, India and Pakistan 
share 17 years of joint democracy, and India and Sri Lanka share 28 years, but there 
are no years of joint democracy between India and Nepal because the latter varies 
between values of -10 and +6 for the period.  
 While these results are far from showing that regime type is highly relevant to 
militarized conflict in Asia, they do demonstrate that there is little identifiable 
statistical difference in the effect in Asia versus that in other parts of the world. They 
also show that regime type is highly relevant for at least one Asian subregion, as well 
as for the region’s relations with outside powers. There may not be unequivocal 
evidence of a “democratic peace” in Asia, but the democratic peace appears of greater 
statistical and substantive significance for Asia’s relations intra-regionally and with 
the rest of the world than is international trade – usually seen as a driving force behind 
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such relations. This point is reinforced by the insignificance of trade’s impact on 
China’s level of conflict with non-Asian states, discussed in more detail below (Table 
6, Model 14).  
 A final point regarding the Kantian variables is that the results for Asia may 
point to issues of conceptual and measurement error. In particular, it seems likely that 
it is necessary to distinguish between different types of international organizations 
rather than simply treating each joint measurement as having an equal marginal 
impact on conflict. Russett and Oneal (2001) and Pevehouse (2002) make similar 
points. The results for regime type also raise questions about the operationalization of 
the theoretical concept of “joint democracy”. In Asia, at least, it appears that using the 
scale based on a dyad’s lower democracy score might be inadequate. Only in a region 
in which a high proportion of the dyads actually achieve joint democracy as indicated 
by a minimum joint score of +7, do we find an effect. However, the variable itself is 
not significantly different from its global effect, and in pooled data it has proven 
significant with great consistency. In smaller samples, it may be that the pacific effect 
of joint full or nearly full democracy still exists, but the linear effect assumed by the 
operationalization does not extend to lower values on the scale. In a region with lower 
overall democracy scores, there appears to be little difference in conflict behavior 
between dyads with varying degrees of “non-democracy” such as, for example, ‘soft’ 
authoritarian regimes like Singapore and harsher ones like Myanmar. The issue of 
operationalization of regime type has been addressed by others (Lai and Reiter  2000; 
Oneal and Russett 2004; Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry 2002). Exploring this issue 
further is not possible in this paper; but the results add some weight to the argument 
that a more theoretically-driven measure of dyad-level regime type may be needed.   
 
Realism 
It appears that the continuing focus of many, if not all, specialists in international 
relations of Asia on realist factors, especially security dilemmas and power 
hierarchies, is justified. But just as in other parts of the world, it is not power balances 
at the dyadic level which tend to reduce conflict, but the asymmetric distribution of 
power, as reflected in the positive and often significant coefficients for power parity 
among Asian and mixed dyads (Table 3) and sub-regional groupings (Table 4) . Also, 
as is the case globally, major powers tend to be more conflictual, so the relative 
frequency of minor power dyads in Asia works to reduce conflict. Although 
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contiguity among Asian dyads is not significantly associated with conflict, the 
measure of distance is – as would be expected if states were vulnerable to security 
dilemma dynamics based simply on the capacities of their militaries to reach each 
other.  
 However, as others have noted (e.g., Oneal and  Russett  2004), knowledge of 
the importance of these factors does not take us very far in understanding what 
choices states can make to enhance the stability of the region. Relative power 
resources and major power status are not usually subject to short-term manipulation 
by political leaders. Distance, of course, even less so. And the realist factor that is 
more under leaders’ control, alliances, does not seem very important to Asian 
security.9 This variable drops out of all equations for Asian dyads because there are so 
few alliances between Asian states (Table 3). It does appear quite significant for 
Asian states’ relations with non-Asian powers, however (Table 3, Models 7-9). Major 
power status, alliances, and especially power parity do appear to have large 
substantive effects on conflict among both Asian and mixed dyads (Table 5). The 
focus of this article is largely on the relevance of liberal factors for Asia, but that 
should not be taken as an argument that realist dynamics are irrelevant – most liberal 
peace research recognizes the continuing relevance of liberal factors as well, and this 
paper is no exception – power still matters in Asia, but realist prescriptions for 
reducing conflict are not the only ones with promise. 
 
Malaysia and the Philippines 
In this section I use a case study of a single dyad to assess the validity of some of the 
causal inferences made from the large-sample analysis by taking a closer look at the 
details of several conflicts and factors assumed to influence conflict behavior. The 
Malaysia-Philippines dyad presents a potentially revealing case of Asian international 
relations especially because it does not obviously confound realist and liberal factors. 
In particular, there are no unambiguous strong common interests or threats that would 
cause realist or self-help motivated “cooperation” within the dyad, thus confounding 
the effect of the liberal factors.10  And some key liberal and power-related factors 
                                                 
9 Indeed, a large number of general studies of alliances and conflict has not uncovered a robust, 
consistent relationship (e.g., Gibler and Vasquez 1998; Gibler 2000; Maoz 2000). 
 
10 This would be a problem if what is perhaps the central ASEAN dyad were examined: Malaysia and 
Indonesia. The “confrontation” policy of Indonesia does end with the forming of ASEAN, but it would 
 18
clearly produce competing predictions, as discussed below. Both states also have 
considerable variation in regime type, allowing the ‘democratic peace’ proposition to 
be examined within one dyad over time, and they are both founding members of 
ASEAN – an organization much-noted by regional specialist, as discussed above. 
Also important, of course, is that there are instances of MIDs between the states, 
reaching relatively high hostility levels. No single case study is likely to be 
appropriate for the study of all important aspects of a broader topic, but this case 
should provide a relevant example not obviously biased for or against any argument. 
 There are 5 dyad-years of militarized interstate disputes between Malaysia and 
the Philippines in the data set, out of a total of 38 dyad-years beginning with the 
creation of the Malay Federation in 1963. These disputes occur in April-December 
1968 (MID level 3), November 1979 (MID level 3), June-November 1980 (MID level 
3 Malaysia, 1 Philippines), September 1985 (MID level 4 Malaysia, 1 Philippines), 
and May-August 1988 (MID level 4 Malaysia, 1 Philippines). The MID scale ranges 
from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating no militarized action, 2, threat to use force, 3, display of 
force, 4, use of force, and 5, war. The COW dataset does not record any fatalities in 
these disputes. This section will examine the details of several of these disputes in the 
broader context of Malaysian-Philippine relations as a plausibility probe for the causal 
story of conflict based on the liberal and realist variables of the large-sample analysis.  
 The historical record, while not providing overwhelming evidence for a single, 
clear-cut influence on the entire conflict process, is suggestive of which factors are 
more likely to be important, in what combination. The conflicts between the 
Philippines and Malaysia are centered on territorial issues stemming from ambiguity 
of the pre-independence colonial borders. This ambiguity led especially to competing 
claims to the Malaysian state of Sabah, previously called North Borneo. The 
Philippines first claimed sovereignty to the territory in 1962, in a nationalist-inspired 
move intended to demonstrate an independent foreign policy rather than one tailored 
to U.S. interests (Amin 2003). The Philippines therefore refused to recognize the 
Federation of Malaysia when it was created, largely at British initiative in the face of 
perceived communist threats in the region, in 1963. Talks in Bangkok failed to 
                                                                                                                                            
be hard to argue that ASEAN was the cause of this reduction in conflict. Rather, power balancing 
concerns based on the threat of communism stemming from the war in Vietnam are usually cited, as 
well as the leadership change in Indonesia from Sukarno, a leftist who sought to oppose legitimizing 
the Malaysian Federation, to Suharto, a rightist who sought rapprochement with Malaysia and closer 
ties with the United States. Reducing conflict with Malaysia and creating ASEAN are usually seen as 
related outcomes of Indonesia’s new foreign policy. 
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resolve the dispute, and there were heated exchanges between the sides in the United 
Nations General Assembly (Samad and Bakar 1992).11  
 Although the Philippines’ claim remained in force, president Marcos 
recognized Malaysia in 1966, and some analysts claim that in order to smooth the 
creation of ASEAN, “there was a tacit agreement between Malaysia and the 
Philippines that the issue be shelved in the interest of regional solidarity” (Samad and 
Bakar 1992, 554-555). The same authors recognize that “the Sabah dispute has never 
been an important agenda item at any ASEAN conference or meeting” (Samad and 
Bakar 1992, 555).  But the historical record clearly shows that the issue was not 
shelved, rather it was the immediate source of hightened tensions between the two 
Southeast Asian states for the next two decades.  
 In the Sabah conflict, there are domestic political issues at stake for both sides, 
each having to do with the territorial integrity of the state. The issue of potential 
separatism in Sabah has been seen as a real threat to Malaysian sovereignty by the 
central government in Kuala Lumpur since 1963. Ethnic and historical differences 
retain salience and Sabah leaders have usually attempted to assert as much autonomy 
as possible (David 1996). It came to light in 1968 that the Philippines was training 
Philippine-Muslim saboteurs on the island of Corregidor with the intention of 
infiltrating them into Sabah for guerilla warfare. Instability in Sabah was seen as in 
Philippine interests both to promote its territorial claims and to serve as a pretext for 
armed intervention. The Muslim trainees, with ethnic and religious ties to the Sabah 
population, allegedly rebelled and at least some were executed by their Philippine 
army commanders (Whitman 2004). This helped to galvanize domestic Muslim 
opposition to the Philippine government, and it led to the creation of the Moro 
National Liberation Front (MNLF). Thus pursuit of the Philippine claim to Sabah 
became not only an issue of the “legitimate” historical boundaries of the state, but 
also one involving separatist tendencies of Muslims living in the Philippines. 
 Adding to the tension with Malaysia created by the revelation of Philippine 
plans for guerrilla warfare in Sabah, the Philippine Congress passed and the president 
signed a law confirming the Philippines’ claim to Sabah. This led to heated exchanges 
at an ASEAN committee meeting, the breaking of diplomatic relations by Malaysia, 
                                                 
11 Although one area analyst (Villacorta 1999, 183) claims that the two sides were on “the brink of war 
in 1963,” I have found no record of the use or threat of force by either side, and the COW data do not 
record a MID in  that year for the dyad. 
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and a Malaysian boycott of ASEAN meetings until the Philippines stopped 
challenging Malaysian sovereignty over Sabah (David 1996).  
 Diplomatic relations were restored in 1969, and Philippine rhetoric subsided. 
However, since at least the early 1970s, it appears that Malaysia has allowed the 
MNLF to use Sabah as a training ground, and also to provide supplies and other 
support to them.  Samad and Bakar (1992, 560) argue that “Malaysian involvement in 
supporting the Moros was not so much based on their commitment to religious duty as 
to pressure the Philippine government to drop its claim to Sabah.” The Marcos regime 
declared martial law in 1972, in part to deal with a growing Muslim revolt on the 
southern island of Mindanao. Malaysia at times openly supported the cause of Muslim 
independence in the southern Philippines, and government support for the Moro 
rebels in Sabah continued at least until 1976 (David 1996). 
 The other territorial issue between Malaysia and the Philippines is the status of 
several islands of the Spratly chain in the South China Sea. The Philippines had 
troops on 5 of the islands in 1968, but Malaysia protested and asserted a claim to 
some of the more southern islands claimed by the Philippines. In 1988, Malaysia’s 
Navy seized 3 fishing boats and 49 Filipino fishermen near one disputed area 
occupied by the Philippines, Commodore or Rizal Reef (David 1996, 61; Samad and 
Bakar 1992, 562). The ensuing disagreement led to another MID recorded in the 
dataset for the dyad. After about 4 months Malaysia released the fishermen, but also 
announced the construction of a new Naval base nearby to counter increased 
“foreign” naval activities. The Philippines instituted naval escorts of its fishing boats 
in the area and accused Malaysia of violating its waters and even firing on its boats. 
Negotiations began in late 1988, but did not result in any agreement (David 1996, 61). 
 With the fall of Marcos and the return of democracy, the new administration 
of Corazon Aquino stated an intention to drop the claim to Sabah. Legislation was 
proposed to officially renounce the claim, but was never passed by the Philippine 
Congress. In 1994 the improvement in bilateral relations was evident in the official 
visit of the Malaysian prime minister, Mahathir Mohammed, to the Philippines. In the 
late 1990s and early 2000s, Philippine presidents Ramos and Arroyo paid some 
attention to the issue of Sabah, allowing its investigation but no further assertions of 
the territorial claim (Amin 2003).  
 But it is far from clear that peace has broken out. The pattern in the 
Philippines of apparent executive preference for playing down or even dropping the 
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claim to Sabah being blocked by legislative resistance has persisted (David 1996). 
The Malaysian approach appears not to have changed very much, although most 
reports say that training and support for separatist groups fighting the Philippine 
government in Sabah has been curtailed or reduced since the 1970s. Although there 
has been increased diplomatic and commercial interaction between the states since 
1988, analysts argue that relations lack “any kinds of formal or informal arrangements 
in almost all areas of cooperation,” the “governments seldom consult each other on 
bilateral matters that would normally have benefited both,” and relations remain 
“strained” “[n]otwithstanding the fact that both states are members of ASEAN.” “The 
Sabah issue appears to be the main irritant to Malaysia-Philippine relations and it has 
functioned as an importanat source of deterioration on other even minor issues of 
dispute” (Samad and Bakar 1992, 563, 564). 
 In order to assess the underlying causes of these patterns of conflict, I first 
look more closely at how these disputes correspond to the independent variables used 
in the statistical analysis.  
 Overall IGO membership and increasing trade seem somewhat promising. The 
total number of joint IGO memberships rises steadily from 18 in 1965 to 57 in 2000.12 
Trade interdependence also rises steadily from 1966, the first year for which data are 
available. Malaysia is consistently more dependent on the trading relationship than the 
Philippines (although Malaysia has a more developed economy, the Philippines has a 
population over three times as large as Malaysia’s). Bilateral trade rises from 
about .29 percent of Malaysian GDP in 1966 to about 1.45 percent in 1998, a five-fold 
increase for the more dependent state. And for the Philippines it rises from .10 to .99 
percent over the same period, a ten-fold increase in the lower dependency score. 
These are fairly small proportions, but while the value of total trade was less than 20 
million current U.S. dollars in 1966, it reached 2.5 billion dollars by 1998 and 3.7 
billion by 2000. Substantively, this steep but still relatively small rise in trade 
interdependence can be seen as the transformation of a truly insignificant trading 
relationship into a moderately meaningful one, especially for Malaysia. While both 
increasing trade and increasing IGO memberships do correspond to increasing 
conflict for the period 1968-1988, the highest values of both variables also correspond 
                                                 
12 Data for IGO memberships for the dyad are missing prior to 1965. Data for GDP are missing prior to 
1966 and after 1998. 
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to the longest period free of MIDs for the dyad, 1989-2000, giving some support for 
liberal expectations. 
 There is no period of joint democracy for the dyad (a lower democracy score 
of at least +7), but each state does reach “democratic” status during the period. 
Malaysia begins the period as a full-fledged democracy, with a polity score of +10 
from 1963 until 1968, and then witnesses a sharp drop in its polity score, to +1 in 
1969, as democracy is failing in Malaysia with ethnic violence leading to the 
suspension of Parliament. The National Front coalition has maintained power ever 
since, and Malaysia’s polity score never rises above 4 after that. For the period from 
1981, Malaysian politics are dominated by Prime Minsiter Mahathir Mohamad. The 
Philippines undergoes a drop from a polity level of +5 to +2 in 1969, and then further 
deteriorates to a low of -8 in 1981. Data are missing for the years 1972-1980, but this 
corresponds with the consolidation of the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos under 
martial law, and scores well below +2, closer to -8, would seem appropriate. A 
process of softening of the dictatorship leads to the removal of Marcos from power in 
1986 and the score jumps from +1 in 1986 to +8 in 1987, where it remains.  
 It does appear that the years of greater dyadic democracy also correspond 
fairly well to the more peaceful periods of the relationship. Before 1969, the dyad 
most closely approaches joint democracy (+5), and only one MID occurs. After 1987 
the dyad again moves higher (+4), and only one MID occurs just after the restoration 
of democracy in the Philippines. The most conflictual period corresponds to the years 
of lower levels of dyadic democracy. For the 14 years when the joint democracy score 
is 0 or lower, three MIDs occur (a frequency of .21 MIDs per year), while during the 
26 years when the joint democracy score is +1 or higher, only 2 MIDs occur (a 
frequency of .08).  
 ASEAN is clearly not a prime candidate for conflict reduction for this dyad, 
even in the eyes of specialists in the region cited above. As two of the founders of the 
organization, both Malaysia and the Philippines are ASEAN members from 1967 
onwards, meaning that all of the MIDs occur after both states join the organization.  
 On the role of ASEAN, David (1996, 63) notes that while Malaysia and 
Vietnam were able to sign and implement an agreement in 1992-1993 on joint oil 
exploration in an area of the South China Sea that both states claim, Malaysia and the 
Philippines are not able to achieve such cooperation. Vietnam was at the time not an 
ASEAN member. David (1996, 62-63) suggests that “it seems to have so far been 
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impossible to reach a similar agreement with the Philippines, an ASEAN partner” 
because Malaysia uses competing claims in the Spratly chain to “pressure Manila into 
formally renouncing its claim to Sabah.” He also predicts that “[d]espite ASEAN’s 
1994 Manila Declaration on the South China Sea, the overlapping claims of Vietnam, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei in the Spratly area will remain a potentially 
divisive issue” (David 1996, 63). 
 In the broader context of the Spratly dispute, ASEAN’s role has been further 
called into doubt by Malaysia’s willingness to deal bilaterally with China on the issue 
(Weincek 2000, 212). Whereas during the Mischief Reef incident of 1995, involving 
Chinese encroachments in Philippine waters, ASEAN showed some degree of 
coordinated response, the total lack of ASEAN response to subsequent Chinese action 
in 1998 and 1999 contributes to the realist picture of the organization as 
epiphenomenal to state-level interests and behavior in Asian security (Chad 2000, 37). 
 Among power-based factors, the balance of power between the two states does 
change over time significantly. As the Malaysian economy grows, the relationship 
moves steadily closer to parity, from a ratio of .36 in 196513  to .66 in 2000 (reaching 
a high of .75 in 1996, right before the Asian financial crisis hit the Malaysian 
economy).This increase provides a prediction countervailing that of rising 
interdependence and international organization membership: over the same period, 
approaching parity predicts increasing conflict. 
 A look at military capabilities reinforces this by suggesting an even closer 
balance between the two states by the mid-1970s. While military expenditures were 
about even in 1963 (around $50 million), by 1972 Malaysian spending on the military 
was more than double that of the Philippines ($275 and $119 million, respectively). 
For the period 1973-2000, Malaysia on average spends double (a factor of 1.99) what 
the Philippines does on the military, and each state keeps roughly 100,000 soldiers 
under arms from the mid-1980s on, as well. So, while the Philippines, due to the total 
size of its population, has more total power resources than Malaysia, the Malaysian 
military is as large as, and much better equipped than, that of the Philippines. The 
movement towards power parity does correspond to the period of increasing conflict 
until 1988, but this indicator cannot explain the subsequent lack of conflict when 
parity seems even closer. 
                                                 
13 It was closer to .5 for the two previous years, 1963-64, but remains below .4 until 1972. 
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 There are no formal alliance ties of any type between the two states, and of 
course there is no variation in the level of contiguity or distance between capitals, so 
these constants cannot explain variation in dyadic conflict. 
In order to explain the occurrence of five disputes in five different years (1968, 
1979, 1980, 1985, 1988) these factors can be combined with the more contextually 
specific examination of the case. The correlations discussed help identify the likely 
important factors. The gradual increase in both IGO membership and trade 
interdependence would make conflict less likely over time, according to liberal 
expectations. It appears that, until roughly the 1990s, the frequency of conflict rises 
for the dyad. But there is at least some support for the pacific effects of these 
variables which reach their highest levels after the 1980s. The effect of ASEAN 
membership in particular does not seem very relevant, simply because there is no 
conflict before the states join the organization, but significant conflict afterwards. 
Perhaps ASEAN norms can be said to be reinforced over time, but this would be an 
ad hoc explanation, based on a long period of about two decades for norms to become 
effective. Perhaps most interestingly, the case for a proto-democratic peace for the 
dyad cannot be ruled out based on the correlation between joint democracy and MIDs.  
 The gradual movement towards parity within the dyad does seem to 
correspond to the increasing frequency of conflict until the 1990s. However, the lack 
of conflict after 1988 obviously does not fit this pattern. It is tempting to argue that 
increasing parity seems to cause conflict until 1988. After this period, greater trade 
ties and international organizations promote peaceful relations. But this is clearly an 
ad hoc and atheoretical fit of competing hypotheses to the data.  
 This brief case study suggests, then, that one of the most likely factors 
affecting conflict between Malaysia and the Philippines is the level of democracy in 
each state. The case study clearly shows that the conflicts are closely tied to domestic 
politics, and in particular Philippine presidents are unlikely to escalate the conflict 
when the democratic system is functioning. It is almost exclusively under the 
dictatorial rule of Marcos that latent conflicts escalate to MIDs between the states. 
There is some case to be made for the pacific effects of trade in international 
organizations, but these factors are not prominent in the historical record, and the 
correlation is weak.   
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China, the Liberal Peace, and Conflict 
Case study evidence provides some support for the existence of a liberal peace in Asia, 
especially for the unexpected factor of joint democracy. Another way to gauge the 
plausibility of the overall results is to examine data relevant to an important country to 
see which patterns prevail in some of the key relationships in the region. China is of 
course seen as an important state to understand because of its rising power status in 
Asia and among the world’s greatest powers. Most regional analysts focus heavily on 
China when discussing present and future security dynamics in Asia. And liberals and 
realists have made claims about the relevance of their theories to understanding and 
dealing with China. Power transition theorists in particular have been arguing China’s 
importance for many decades (Organski 1958; Tammen et al. 2000). In this section I 
use dyads including China and other Asian states, and China and non-Asian states, to 
assess which of the Kantian and realist factors seem to affect China’s conflict 
behavior.  
 It might be a logical liberal supposition that increased trade links will 
moderate Chinese behavior with its important trading partners. But among all of the 
models presented in this article, the only significant positive effect of trade on conflict 
is in Asian states’ interaction with China. In these dyads trade appears to increase 
conflict, rather than dampen it (Table 6, Model 13). This is consistent with the result 
noted above that liberal expectations for trade among most Asian dyads are not 
supported. It also supports realists’ assertions that trade, by increasing the 
opportunities for tension, can increase conflict (Friedberg 1993/94 makes this 
argument for Asia). The effects of trade among Asian states clearly vary.  
 Also consistent with the results presented above, entangling China in a web of 
international institutions seems a more promising way to reduce conflict in Asia, and 
globally as well. Both for relations with other Asian states, and with states from 
outside the region, there can be little doubt that shared membership in international 
organizations is associated with less conflict (Table 6, Models 13-14). For China’s 
relations with Asian states, there are no other significant effects on conflict in this 
standard, theoretically-based model. This suggests the limits of applying general 
theories to specific cases, but also perhaps the need for a better specified model and 
more nuanced operationalization of some variables, as discussed above.  
 For China’s relations with non-Asian states, the model seems better specified. 
It is clear, in particular, that China has more conflictual relations with democratic 
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states from outside the region (Table 5, Model 14). Regime type does matter here, but 
there is a clear tendency for China to have greater conflict with fully democratic states. 
This no doubt has much to do with conflict patterns during the cold war.  
Among those concerned with China’s rise, power transition theorists have 
argued that increasing power parity will also increase the danger of major power 
conflict involving China, projecting a general theory onto a specific case (Tammen et 
al. 2000). There is evidence to support this claim for China. Power parity is a highly 
significant correlate of conflict in Chinese relations with non-Asian states, including 
the world’s major powers. The weakly significant effect of contiguity is likely due to 
Sino-Soviet conflict during the Cold War.  
 As far as major power relations with China are concerned, the results here 
provide mixed support for standard liberal prescriptions of “engagement.” The results 
clearly support the prescription of enmeshing the PRC in a thick web of international 
organizations, because as its power increases, the chances of conflict with major 
powers such as Russia, key EU states, Japan, and of course the U.S. will also increase. 
And because these major powers are democratic, or at least more democratic than 
China, conflict is more likely. However, trade links of economic interdependence do 
not seem to significantly reduce the likelihood of conflict with China, perhaps 
because of the sheer size of the Chinese economy.  
 
Conclusions 
Perhaps the major substantive conclusion from the analysis presented here is that 
international organizations are the most consistent factor affecting the likelihood of 
interstate conflict in Asian and between Asia and the rest of the world. The effect is 
significantly less potent than in the rest of the world, but nevertheless it is significant 
and consistent for Asian dyads, mixed dyads, and, importantly, for China’s relations 
with Asian and outside powers. Neither trade, nor democracy, nor power-related 
factors like alliance and power balances appear to be as reliable in their potential for 
conflict reduction. And substantively the marginal effect of increases in joint IGO 
membership is large.   
 With that said, another finding is that there is little evidence that supposedly 
important regional organizations have much effect on their members’ behavior. This 
is borne out by the overall statistical results, showing a substantively and statistically 
less significant effect for Asian dyads, which share a much greater proportion of 
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Asian IGO memberships. It is well-supported by the statistical examination of specific 
Asian IGOs, which shows no significant effect for ASEAN, SAARC, or APEC. And 
the case study of the Malaysian-Philippine dyad presents little convincing evidence 
that joint ASEAN membership reduces dyadic conflict.  
 Among the other Kantian variables, there is little support for the conflict-
reducing effects of trade interdependence in Asia. The results are inconsistent – 
usually insignificant, but significantly negative among ASEAN dyads, significantly 
positive in Asian states’ relations with China. Overall no robust pattern emerges. This 
is somewhat unexpected in a region known for its “trading state” mentality. 
 But the results for the effect of regime type on conflict are somewhat more 
consistent, and at least as unexpected, as those for trade. Joint democracy clearly has 
substantive and statistical significance for conflict between Asian and non-Asian 
states. And although the negative effects of joint democracy on conflict at all levels 
do not reach statistical significance for Asian dyads, they are consistently negative 
and they cannot be shown to be significantly different from the effects for other dyads. 
In other words, joint democracy is the only Kantian factor which shows no 
statistically significant difference between its effect for Asian dyads and its effect for 
all other dyads. Also surprising, in the case study, the most plausible factor explaining 
patterns of Malaysian-Philippine conflict is the level of joint democracy.   
 The answer to the central question posed by this article, then, is a fairly clear 
“yes” – there is considerable evidence that the liberal peace propositions, at least two 
out of three, do apply to Asia. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics, 1950-2000
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
All disputes 0.037 0.188 0 1 54872
All disputes, Asian dyads 0.128 0.334 0 1 3765
Fatal disputes 0.013 0.113 0 1 54583
Fatal disputes, Asian dayds 0.059 0.236 0 1 3686
Wars 0.004 0.066 0 1 54872
Wars, Asian dyads 0.024 0.153 0 1 3765
Regime score (smaller) -2.073 6.804 -10 10 42292
Regime score (smaller), Asian dayds -4.498 5.157 -10 10 2865
Trade interdependence 0.0017 0.0065 0 0.1526 49619
Trade interdependence, Asian dyads 0.0033 0.0132 0 0.1408 3449
Joint IGO membership 27.993 15.734 0 107 54244
Joint IGO membership, Asian dyads 22.730 14.599 0 66 3719
Joint alliance memberhship 0.193 0.395 0 1 54872
Joint alliance memberhship, Asian dyads 0.011 0.103 0 1 3765
Minor power dyads 0.298 0.457 0 1 54872
Minor power dyads, Asian dyads 0.534 0.499 0 1 3765
Colonial contiguity 0.023 0.151 0 1 54872
Colonial contiguity, Asian dyads 0.016 0.126 0 1 3765
Contiguity 0.223 0.416 0 1 54872
Contiguity, Asian dyads 0.464 0.499 0 1 3765
Parity 0.147 0.225 0 1 54872
Parity, Asian dyads 0.181 0.224 0 1 3765
Distance 3403.431 2770.878 5 11989 54872
Distance, Asian dyads 1844.416 1453.767 121 6708 3765  
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Table 2. Liberal and Realist Sources of Conflict, 1950-2000
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
All disputes
Fatal 
disputes Wars
Regime score (smaller) -0.023 ** -0.015 -0.077 **
0.011 0.019 0.039
Regime score (smaller), Asian dyads -0.002 0.009 0.066
0.041 0.066 0.137
Trade interdependence -91.308 **** -225.221 **** -380.996 **
27.920 67.714 164.353
Trade interdependence, Asian dyads 86.971 **** 202.586 **** -904.326
29.189 68.876 1269.791
IGO memberships -0.474 ***** -0.867 ***** -1.263 *****
0.100 0.135 0.152
IGO memberships, Asian dyads 0.252 ** 0.353 * 0.879 ***
0.114 0.187 0.332
Minor power dyad -0.792 **** -0.382 -1.253 **
0.247 0.301 0.588
Allies -0.292 -0.354 0.130
0.182 0.266 0.644
Parity 1.506 ***** 1.840 ***** 3.208 *****
0.364 0.405 0.739
Colonial contiguity 0.853 **** 0.789 0.239
0.258 0.482 0.749
Contiguity 1.503 ***** 1.013 ***** 0.360
0.252 0.258 0.467
Distance -0.348 **** -0.408 **** -0.163
0.101 0.138 0.308
Constant -0.069 0.314 -2.030
0.916 1.197 2.768
N= 37763 37549 37763
Wald chi2 397.90 267.73 216.50
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
*****p<.001, ****p<.005, ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
2-tailed tests  
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Table 3. Liberal and Realist Sources of Conflict, 1950-2000
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Asian dyads Mixed dyads
Wars
Regime score (smaller) -0.025 -0.037 -0.002 -0.114 **** -0.109 * -0.233 *****
0.040 0.065 0.056 0.035 0.062 0.055
Trade interdependence -6.583 -18.047 -330.415 -25.428 -477.547 ** -380.864
10.788 17.853 246.568 59.400 232.137 335.269
IGO memberships -0.271 ** -0.370 * -0.362 -0.770 ***** -1.234 ***** -1.017 *****
0.125 0.203 0.230 0.167 0.240 0.282
Minor power dyad -0.925 *** -0.401 -0.943 -- -- --
0.354 0.442 0.598
Allies -- -- -- -4.774 ***** -5.711 ***** -2.727 *****
0.508 0.745 0.616
Parity 1.364 ** 0.798 0.659 4.129 ***** 4.687 ***** 4.259 *****
0.597 0.753 1.225 0.952 0.971 1.129
Colonial Contiguity -- -- -- 1.032 * 0.895 2.591 ***
0.586 1.004 0.942
Contiguity 0.413 0.122 -0.666 -- -- --
0.357 0.432 0.683
Distance -0.769 **** -0.708 ** -0.621 -0.178 0.770 0.628 **
0.238 0.356 0.514 0.564 0.534 0.548
Constant 3.879 ** 2.876 2.539 -2.257 -10.398 ** -10.976
1.934 2.723 3.935 5.114 4.865 5.097
N= 2639 2574 2639 9259 9230 9259
Wald chi2 41.36 17.82 21.39 208.25 147.05 69.17
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.013 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
*****p<.001, ****p<.005, ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
2-tailed tests
Wars
All 
disputes
Fatal 
disputes
All 
disputes
Fatal 
disputes
 
 36
Table 4 Realist and Liberal sources of conflict, 1950-2000
Selected Asian international organizations
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
ASEAN SAARC APEC
All disputes All disputes All disputes
Regime score (smaller) -0.032 -0.060 ** -0.045
0.077 0.028 0.049
Trade interdependence -25.543 *** 300.019 -4.737
9.290 197.747 6.808
IGO memberships -0.819 1.324 -0.603 *****
0.551 1.335 0.128
ASEAN -1.286 -- --
0.833
SAARC -- -0.244 --
0.561
APEC -- -- 0.040
0.365
Parity 1.008 13.270 *** -1.040
1.167 4.779 0.931
Contiguity 0.135 -- 0.033
1.182 0.477
Distance -1.523 ** 0.905 -0.442
0.775 0.906 0.293
Constant 9.932 * -15.500 ** 3.229
5.332 7.872 2.428
N= 588 183 1101
Wald chi2 184.55 25.05 62.93
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
1. Only Asian APEC members included.
*****p<.001, ****p<.005, ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
2-tailed tests  
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Table 5. Marginal effects on MIDs
Lowest to 
highest value
One standard 
deviation
Asian dyads
Regime type -18.40% -4.59%
Trade interdependence -30.06% -2.83%
IGO memberships -39.11% -8.27%
Minor power dyad -48.84% -2.44%
Parity 46.89% 12.05%
Mixed dyads
Regime Type -107.46% -32.72%
Trade interdependence -30.51% -2.54%
IGO memberships -148.91% -28.27%
Mutual defense pact alliance -44.93% -7.12%
Parity 185.55% 37.91%
Percentage change in the probability of a MID; based on Models 4 and 7.
Based on actual frequency of MID-years of .1278 for Asian dyads and .0188 for Mixed dyads.
All other variables held at their median values.
Change in given variable:
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Table 6. Realist and Liberal Sources of Conflict with China
Model 13 Model 14
w/ Asian states w/ non-Asian states
All disputes All disputes
Monadic democracy 0.118 1.556 **
0.493 0.681
Trade interdependence 19.452 ***** -92.748
5.271 175.220
IGO memberships -0.336 *** -1.008 *****
0.124 0.154
Parity 2.041 6.195 *****
1.357 0.767
Colonial contiguity 1.124 1.213
0.750 0.938
Contiguity -0.521 1.891 *
0.492 1.066
Distance -0.371 0.914
0.336 0.986
Constant 1.405 -12.700
2.563 8.854
N= 986 4082
Wald chi2 88.83 196.72
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
*****p<.001, ****p<.005, ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10
2-tailed tests  
 
